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Political Perestroika and the Rise of Rukh
Ukrainian Nationalism, 1989-90
by
Scott Cooper

Introduction

The Soviet Union without the Ukraine may
never have become a superpower. The
Ukraine's fertile soil, situated in a relatively
mild climate, has been breadbasket to Russia
for almost four centuries. Its rich mineral
resources provided much of the coal and
iron necessary for Stalin's industrialization,
and its millions of skilled workers provided
much of the manpower. In fact, Roman
Szporluk points out that, because Great
Russians make up only about 52 percent of
the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians (between them compromising 20
percent of the population) are the crucial,
marginal factor which allows continued
Slavic domination of the diverse Soviet
empire (1986, 153). Without their cooperation, the empire would be too unwieldy and
unstable.

Precisely because of the Ukraine's importance, any nationalist or separatist feeling
within the Ukraine must be taken seriously.
Soviet historians attempt to minimize the
differences between Russians and their
Ukrainian kin. The Communist Party officially predicts and proclaims the gradual
merger of the two nationalities into one
people (Chirovsky 1984a, 17). In spite of
this, the Party has been unable to stamp out
Ukrainian nationalism, even by extreme
methods. And in the Gorbachev era nationalist feeling has exploded from hiding,
apparently only strengthened by centuries of
Russian domination and decades of Soviet
oppression. This paper will trace the development of this nationalist feeling in order to
show how historical factors have led to
recent, dramatic changes in Ukrainian politics. I will focus especially on this feeling
of nationalism, to the exclusion of economic
factors, in explaining Ukrainian political
change. While economic factors are obvi-
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ously a critical element in recent events,
space restrictions prevent me from discussing these factors in any detail.

Cossack state is the historical source of
modem Ukrainian nationalism. The memory of this period of autonomy has driven
twentieth century nationalists to seek greater
freedom from Moscow.

Kievan-Rus' and Polish Rule
The Ukraine first existed as the Kievan-Rus'
state, which reached the peak of its territorial expansion under Prince Vladimir one
thousand years ago. Vladimir ruled virtually all of the European portion of the presentday USSR, from the Black Sea in the south
to the White Sea in the north, and from the
Danube in the west to the Volga basin in the
east (Chirovsky 1984a, 124). But, because
of its size, Vladimir's empire proved too
weak to survive, although he tried to unify
it by Christianizing his subjects. In the
years 1236 to 1240 the weakened kingdom
was thoroughly conquered by the invading
Mongols. One hundred years later, the
weakened Mongols were displaced by a
Lithuanian-Rus' commonwealth. But the
commonwealth was short-lived; in l385,
Lithuania united with a stronger Poland and
ended Rus' sovereignty. Also at this time,
the name "Ukraine" (literally, "at the edge")
emerged because of the nation's position at
the border of Europe and Asia.
Catholic Poland ruled the Ukraine for
almost three centuries but was bitterly resisted by the Orthodox Ukrainian nation.
Poland exploited the Ukraine's resources
and population without preventing attacks by
Crimean Tatars and other invaders from the
East (Chirovsky 1984b, 28-29). The result
of this unrest was the emergence of the
Cossacks, groups that fled Polish rule for
the vast steppes of the eastern and southern
Ukraine, which were free of foreign domination. By the mid-1500s these Cossacks
had elected a "hetman" as their leader and
considered themselves autonomous. This

Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Russian Rule
The year 1648 marked the triumphant peak
of the Cossack state; Hetman Bohdan
Khmelnytsky destroyed the Polish army and
declared the Ukraine a sovereign state. As
usual, however, Ukrainian independence
was short-lived. By 1654 continued war
with Poland had weakened the Ukraine
dramatically and Khmelnytsky was forced to
form an alliance with the newly emergent
Muscovite Empire. Ukrainian historians
claim that Khmelnytsky's 1654 treaty with
Russia was merely a military alliance (Chirovsky 1984b, 183), but for over three centuries Russian and Soviet leaders have interpreted the treaty as a complete Ukrainian
submission to Moscow.
Russia, as the stronger power, was able
to interpret the treaty as it saw fit, despite
Ukrainian protest.
Ukrainian autonomy
gradually decreased until, from 1763 to
1783, Catherine the Great introduced serfdom to the Ukraine, tying the peasants to
the land. The next century and a half of
tsarist rule failed, however, to "Russify" the
Ukrainian people; history had given the
Ukraine a taste of autonomy and independence which tsarist restrictions could not
overcome.

Bolshevik Rule
Upon seizing power in 1917, one of the
Bolsheviks' first acts was a "Declaration of
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the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which
granted sovereignty and even separation to
the Russian Empire's nationalities (Dmytryshyn 1977, 485). The Ukrainian Rada
(or parliament) in Kiev established an independent Ukrainian Peoples Republic within
days. The next two years saw bitter civil
war in the Ukraine, which was alternately
controlled by the Bolshevik Red Army,
Germany, Ukrainian nationalists, the White
Army, and finally by the Red Army. In
1921 the Ukraine was split between Poland
and Russia and on December 30, 1922, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, with its
capital at Kiev, entered the Soviet Union.
By the mid-1920s, Mykola Skrypnyk, a
Ukrainian Bolshevik who advocated the
"Ukrainization" of the republic, was the
dominant political figure in the Ukraine.
Although his power was limited, he was
able to increase the number of Ukrainians in
the party elite, the use of the Ukrainian
language in political life, and the number of
books and newspapers published in Ukrainian (Mace 1983, 305). This limited Ukrainization, however, was terminated by Stalin
by 1932. Skrypnyk was denounced and
committed suicide. The forced collectivization of 1932-33 crushed the Ukrainian peasantry and the accompanying famine left
millions dead.
The Ukrainians' next brief taste of freedom came when Nazi troops "liberated"
them during World War II. The Ukraine
soon turned against the oppressive German
rule and fought the Germans until the Red
Army returned to the Ukraine in 1944--at
which point the Ukrainian nationalists turned
their weapons against the communists.
Bilocerkowycz states that anti-Soviet guerilla
activities continued until 1950, with isolated
attacks as late as 1956 (1988, 20).

Since Stalin
Since Stalin's death, nationalism has been
expressed mainly through the dissident
movement. These dissidents have called for
increasing Ukrainian autonomy and Ukrainization as well as for basic human rights.
Each of the postwar communist leaders of
the Ukraine has treated dissent harshly; the
dissidents of the post-Stalin era have faced
lengthy jail sentences, forced exile, and
"psychiatric treatment." But the dissident
movement has survived. Bilinsky even
suggest that the crackdowns have only produced "professional oppositionists" who
have survived labor camps and returned to
dissent (1983, 9).
Between 1953 and 1976 both the First
and Second Secretaries of the Ukrainian
Communist Party have been Ukrainians.
Even more importantly, the Ukrainian First
Secretary has been on the Soviet Politburo
since 1953. Thus, the traditional importance
of the Second Secretary of the non-Russian
republics has diminished in the Ukraine:
each of the First Secretaries (Shelest,
Shcherbitsky, and Ivashko) has been even
more powerful than his Second Secretary.
Almost all of the top positions in the Ukrainian party, government, and KGB have been
filled by Ukrainians. As mentioned previously, Ukrainians fill a crucial role in the
continued Slavic domination of the Soviet
Union. In fact, the Ukraine actually "exports" cadres to Moscow rather than importing them (Gustafson and Mann 1988, 37).
This obviously implies that the Ukrainians
have attained a high amount of trust in
Moscow. But Motyl also points out that
moving a Ukrainian party official to Moscow has the added advantage of separating
him from any independent power base in the
Ukraine, "preventing the formation of a
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native--autonomous--Ukrainian elite" (1987,
123).
This policy of isolation has not been
entirely successful though. In the 1950s,
Pyotr Shelest managed to form a strong
power base from which he pushed for greater Ukrainian sovereignty within the Soviet
Union and for cultural individuality, much
as Skrypnyk had done in the 1920s. His
Ukrainization led eventually to his replacement in 1972 by Vladimir Shcherbitsky,
who also established an independent power
base. Shcherbitsky, however, was strongly
pro-Russian and an enemy of Ukrainization.
Shcherbitsky's success shows that Ukrainian communists are useful to the Soviet
regime; Shelest's removal shows that those
same Ukrainian communists must tread
carefully to avoid offending Moscow.
Ukrainian nationalism is anathema to Soviet
leaders, even when mixed with a heavy dose
of communism. Up until the Gorbachev
period, the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Communist Party were tied firmly to Moscow.
Even though the various republics are constitutionally sovereign states, "their sovereignty seems to be limited only in all the
areas in which they might want to take
action" (Hough and Fainsod 1979, 483).

Gorbachev and Perestroika
Mikhail Gorbachev' s rise to power has
obviously brought unprecedented change to
the Soviet Union. But initial change came
very slowly to the Ukraine. Ruled under
the iron fist of longtime Ukrainian Party
leader Vladimir Shcherbitsky, the Ukraine
was among the most conservative republics.
Shcherbitsky's grip was not even loosened
by the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. Long
after Gorbachev had removed all other
Brezhnev-era members of the Soviet Politbu-

ro, Shcherbitsky held on to power in the
Ukraine and in the Politburo. His power
and longevity in office probably stem from
his tight control of the Ukrainian party
machine and of the Ukraine's mineral,
industrial, and agricultural resources, which
are vital to the economic success of the
country as a whole (Keller 1989a, A6).
Shcherbitsky's grip began to fail in early
1989. Under pressure from Moscow, the
Ukraine held parliamentary elections which
allowed some degree of competition. Even
though Shcherbitsky himself ran without
opposition, several key Ukrainian party
figures were embarrassed by newcomers
(Keller 1989a, A6). It was an unmistakable
sign of dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian
Communist Party and thus with Shcherbitsky
himself. Then, in July the Ukraine's allimportant mines were paralyzed by a miners
strike and the formation of unofficial (hence,
illegal) committees to represent the republic's miners. With Moscow pressuring him
to solve the strikes peacefully and with an
unprecedented number of protesters involved
(tens or hundreds of thousands of people),
Shcherbitsky was unable to resort to the
repressive methods by which he had ruled
the Ukraine for seventeen years. He was
forced to yield to some of the miners' demands.
Perhaps the crucial event was the formation in September, 1989, of Rukh, the Ukrainian People's Movement for Restructuring. Rukh's founding congress united a
wide variety of different groups including
priests from both the Orthodox Church and
the (still illegal) Ukrainian Catholic Church,
reform-minded communists and intellectuals,
environmentalist "Greens," and the radical,
prison-hardened "professional oppositionists"
of the Ukraine Helsinki Union. Each group
had its own goals and demands--from reform
of the socialist system to outright secession
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from the Soviet Union--but they seemed to
unite in the recurring chant, "Shcherbitsky
. . . Resign" (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1989,
2).
Their common platform demanded
greater changes in the Ukrainian economy,
concern for the environment, and development of the Ukrainian culture (Izvestia 1989,
3).

tion put further pressure on I vashko and
Gorbachev to make more radical changes .
The year 1989 had marked a turning
point in Ukrainian politics. Popular unrest
had led to greater liberalization and to the
fall of the Ukraine's party chief. But the
underlying problems were not resolved and
Ivashko too would prove unable to stem the
rising flood of public anger and disillusionment.

Ivashko
The unification of such a broad range of
opposition groups mortally wounded Shcherbitsky's power base. Within weeks of the
Rukh congress, Gorbachev was able to
remove Shcherbitsky from the Soviet Politburo and, one week later, from the head of
the Ukrainian Party. His replacement was
Vladimir Ivashko, a protege of Shcherbitsky, who nonetheless saw the need for
economic reform. He offered to help Rukh
obtain legal status and to cooperate with the
nationalists as long as they refrained from
advocating secession from the USSR (Keller
1989b, AI3). In this way he hoped to
moderate Rukh's most extreme demands.
Unfortunately for Ivashko, events were
already moving rapidly, especially in the
western Ukraine which had been free of
Soviet rule until World War II and which
was less Russified than the eastern portion
of the republic. Frequent demonstrations
continued and in late October more than one
hundred peoples' fronts from allover the
USSR met at Chelyabinsk to discuss the
democratization of the Soviet Union. One
writer called the meeting "a people's Duma
that is trying to sum up and express all the
opinions in our society," referring to the
tsarist Duma, a sort of weak parliament
(Zhavoronkov 1989, 13). Each new demonstration and each new meeting and organiza-

1990 Elections
The republic-wide elections of February and
March, 1990, shifted the political balance in
the Ukraine. The odds were stacked fairly
heavily against Rukh: It could not officially
nominate candidates because it was not
recognized in time by the government, it
was not allowed to publish its own newspaper, and the Communist Party was able to
guarantee safe seats to many of its own
officials (Keller 1990, A12). In spite of
these difficulties, Rukh-approved candidates
managed to win one-fourth of the seats in
the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Also, Ivashko and many other senior communists were
unable to win on the first ballot and were
forced into run-off elections. By contrast,
many Rukh leaders won on the first ballot,
including several former political prisoners
representing the Ukraine Helsinki Union
(Keller 1990, AI2). Ivashko eventually, but
not easily, retained his seat and was elected
chairman of the republic's parliament, making him head of both the Ukrainian Party
and government.
In July, Ukrainian miners provoked a
political avalanche by threatening another
strike. Their basic demands included the
resignation of the government (because of its
failure to carry out the promises of the
previous year) and the removal of the Party
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from economic decision-making (Izvestia
1990, 1, 3). The Ukrainian parliament,
with many of its conservative communist
majority in Moscow for the Communist
Party Congress, felt itself unable to deal
with the strike and so it ordered all missing
members to return to Kiev immediately
(Tsikora 1990a, 2). The majority returned
but Ivashko, as a Politburo member and a
key figure in the Party Congress, was unable to return. Criticizing both the parliament's order to return and those communists
in the Ukrainian parliament who had supported the order, Ivashko resigned his chairmanship of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
(while retaining his leadership of the party).

Soverei 2nty
His replacement, Leonid Kravchuk, the
Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was not elected for two weeks.
This interval saw remarkable changes in the
Ukraine. On July 16, 1990, the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet overwhelmingly declared
(355 to 4) the republic's political sovereignty (Clines 1990a, AI). In startlingly clear
language, parliament claimed the "supremacy, independence, fullness, and indivisibility
of the republic's power on its territory and
its independence and equality in external
relations" (Clines 1990a, A10). The declaration claimed for the Ukraine the right to
its own citizenship; the right to control its
own natural resources; the right to create its
own financial, currency, and economic
systems; the right to annul laws passed in
Moscow; and the right to control troops on
its own territory (Pravda 1990, 2; Clines
1990a, AI, A10). The Ukraine did not
claim full independence, but its declaration
was reminiscent of the sovereign Cossack
state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-

ries. The New York Times noted that the
"declaration was crafted to reflect the Ukraine's rich history of centuries of dynasty
and principality, when Kiev was a major
political, commercial, and cultural center"
(Clines 1990a, AlO).
The declaration of sovereignty marked
the Ukraine as one of the most radical of the
Soviet Union's fifteen republics. Only the
three Baltic republics have gone further and
claimed the right to secede from the union.
It is important to note the near unanimity of
the vote, indicating that both communist and
Rukh delegates to the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet saw the need (or felt the public pressure) for radical change. The fifteen republics will soon be negotiating a new treaty of
union with Moscow and the Ukraine appears
to have staked out a rigid negotiating posiIt remains to be seen whether
tion.
Gorbachev has the power to force compromise on the republics.
These steps towards sovereignty, however, proved only the prelude to even greater
demands. With store shelves consistently
empty, the Ukrainian discontent continues to
grow. On September 30, Rukh and other
nationalist groups held a huge procession
and rally in downtown Kiev. Izvestia reported that over one hundred thousand
people attended, making it the largest such
unofficial rally held in Kiev in the postWorld War II era (Tsikora 1990b, 1-2).
The next day saw the beginning of a republic-wide strike which, although it included
only a fraction of the republic's workers,
increased the perception of discontent. The
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet certainly must
have noticed. The following day's events
added to the pressure: Policemen and protesters clashed near the Supreme Soviet
building, leaving twenty demonstrators and
fifteen policemen injured (Tsikora 1990c,
2).
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Student Protest
A small group of students escalated the
situation one step further in early October.
As an outgrowth of the relatively unsuccessful work stoppage, about two hundred students started a hunger strike in a tent city
they had constructed in Kiev's central plaza,
at the very feet of the imposing statue of
Lenin. (Somewhat ironically, the plaza is
named the Square of the October Revolution.) The hunger strike mushroomed into
republic-wide student protest.
Tens of
thousands of students travelled to Kiev in
support. Colleges across the city and republic were barricaded and closed by students
refusing to attend classes. Demonstrators in
other cities voiced their support. According
to the New York Times,
The student demonstration appeared to provide
what Rukh and other opposition outlets had not yet
been able to apply, a simple focus, with doctors
dramatically measuring the hunger strikers' health,
for venting dissatisfaction with the communist
status quo and its hard economic times (Clines
1990b, A4).

The student demands increased the
radicalization of Ukrainian politics. Criticizing the only-partially democratic elections
of the previous spring, students called for a
republic-wide referendum on whether or not
to dissolve the parliament and hold new
elections. This referendum would in effect
be a vote of confidence in the parliament
(Reuters 1990, A6). The hunger strikers
also demanded a new constitution implementing the J ul y declaration of sovereignty,
laws allowing Ukrainian military recruits to
serve on Ukrainian soil, confiscation of the
Communist Party's vast property holdings,
and the resignation of the Ukraine's Prime
Minister, Vitaly Masol (Clines 1990b, AI,
A4).

Two weeks later, the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet accepted most of the demands.
Prime Minister Masol agreed to step down
and the Supreme Soviet agreed to a new
constitution, a referendum on dissolving
parliament, and a law keeping Ukrainian
troops in the Ukraine. In short, they agreed
to begin putting into law those rights
claimed in theory in July. This will certainly meet with opposition in Moscow, increasing the Ukraine's conflict with Gorbachev.
In addition, a substantial portion of the
Ukrainian population opposes these changes.
This group includes not only communists
with a stake in the status quo but also ethnic
Russians worried by an increasingly antiRussian Ukrainian nationalism. Finally, the
student protest has forced Rukh to further
radicalize its own demands (Clines 1990b,
A4). Previously Rukh had avoided calling
for outright independence (although some
groups under the Rukh umbrella had done
so). Now, in order to stay in the lead of
public opinion, Rukh fully endorsed complete independence from the USSR.

Conclusions
Lenin remarked once that "for us to lose the
Ukraine would be the same as losing our
head" (Keller 1989b, A13). An observer
viewing the Ukraine in 1985 might have
assumed (as many did) that the Ukraine had
no strong nationalist feelings and the Ukrainian and Russian nations had virtually become one. With the exception of a few
dissident groups, the Ukraine seemed passively content with its role in the Soviet
state. Recent events, though, have proved
this view false. It is becoming increasingly
clear that the Ukrainian nation exists and
remembers its past independence, however
short-lived. And seventy years of commu-
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nist repression has only deepened that feeling. The explosive nature of that sentiment
surprised both Western and communist
observers--inc1uding Mikhail Gorbachev.
Today, Ukrainian public discussion is almost
controlled by nationalist voices. The dismal
economic situation fans the flames of dissent. Even the communist-dominated parliament has rebelled and demanded greater
freedom and autonomy than Moscow appears willing to offer. Unless Gorbachev is
able to neutralize the Ukraine's current
momentum, the Soviet Union may have to
learn to live without its head.
Gorbachev does have a few remaining
cards to play though. First, the Ukrainian

parliament, although rebellious, is still
controlled by Communist Party members
with a personal stake in the status quo.
Second, the Ukraine's sizable Russian minority and the Russification of the eastern
Ukraine provide a check on any thoughts of
independence. Third, the powers of the
state, especially the Army, are still controlled by Moscow, giving Gorbachev very
real leverage in overcoming rebellion. Will
Gorbachev resort to such drastic measures to
hold the Soviet Union together? It appears
increasingly possible that he or some other
Soviet leader will face just such a choice in
the Ukraine in the not-so-distant future.

,
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